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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Despite the deceleration in output growth, unemployment rates have decreased over the last 
decade. The overall unemployment rate declined from about 4½ percent in 2000 to about 
3 percent in 2012, while youth unemployment decreased from about 11 percent to about 
9 percent over the same period (see chart). While the Korean unemployment rates are 
currently among the lowest in OECD countries, the labor market duality (including the high 
share of non-regular workers) and the underemployment in some segments of the population 
(notably youth and women, see chart) are important labor market challenges, and factors 
contributing to lower potential growth. 
This paper will provide an analysis of key labor 
market challenges to foster growth.1 Our results 
suggest that the benefits of comprehensive 
structural reforms are likely to be considerable 
over the medium term. In particular, 
comprehensive policy reforms (such as: making 
the tax treatment of second earners in households 
compared with that of single earners more 
neutral; increasing childcare benefits; and 
facilitating more part-time work opportunities) 
aimed at reducing labor market distortions that 
inhibit labor force participation could increase 
female participation rates by about 8 percentage 
points over the medium term, which would reduce 
by one-third the gap between the rates of male 
and female participation. Similarly, policy 
actions—including targeted educational policies 
and retraining programs—to bring skill 
mismatches back onto a downward path before 
2005 can increase the youth employment rate by 
0.6 percentage points per year, which would boost 
it back up to its level from before the Asian crisis within 10 years. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section will analyze the evolution of 
female labor force participation in Korea, also compare it to those in other OECD countries, 
and provide an empirical analysis of reforms that could boost female participation over the 
medium term. Section III will examine trends in youth employment, and assess the role of 
labor market mismatches as impediments to job creation. Section IV will discuss the labor 
market duality and associated policy remedies. Section V will conclude by summarizing the 
main policy implications. 
                                                                 
1 See Jain-Chandra and Zhang (2014) for a discussion of product market reforms to foster Korea’s potential 
growth. 
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II.   BOOSTING FEMALE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
Although female labor force participation has 
increased markedly over the last two decades, from 
about 50 percent in 1990 to 59 percent in 2011, 
significant gender differences in participation still 
persist. In particular, the male participation rates are 
still 22½ percentage points higher than those for 
females, with the gender gap particularly high—
above 35 percent—for age groups 25–29, 30–34 
and 35–39 (see chart).  
Female participation rates are not only low 
compared to those for men in Korea, but also 
compared to female participation rates in other 
OECD countries. In particular, female labor force 
participation rates in Korea are among the lowest in 
the OECD (see chart), and almost 20 percentage 
points below those prevailing in the best performing 
countries (Iceland and the Nordic countries). 
While part of the cross-country differences in 
participation rates may simply mirror differences in 
socio-cultural factors, removing policy distortions 
that prevent female participation is a key to 
fostering growth and reducing inequality. First, 
higher female participation rates can increase the 
labor supply, offsetting downward pressures on it 
resulting from population aging, and thereby boost 
potential output over the medium term. Second, as 
preferences for female participation tend to be 
higher than the actual female participation rates, 
removing market distortions that inhibit female 
participation can lead to a higher level of aggregate 
income and welfare. Third, reducing the gap between male and female participation can help 
to reduce inequality. 
The next section assesses the roles of various factors determining the pattern of female 
participation rates in Korea compared to those in other OECD countries, focusing on policy 
instruments that can be used to reduce market distortions and raise the female participation 
rates. 
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A.   Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Female Labor Force Participation 
The determinants of labor force participation in Korea compared to other OECD countries are 
estimated using panel regressions for an unbalanced sample of 30 OECD countries over the 
period 1985–2011. In detail, the following difference-in-difference equation is estimated: 
ܮܴܲ௜௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߬௧ ൅ ࢼ′ࢄ࢏࢚ ൅ ߝ௜௧       (1) 
 
where LPR indicates the female labor force participation rates; ߙ௜ are the country fixed 
effects, which capture unobserved factors including socio-cultural ones; ߬௧ are time fixed 
effects which capture the impacts of common and country-specific unobserved shocks 
affecting the participation rates, and X is a set of policy variables that have been found in the 
literature to be robust determinants of female participation (Jaumotte, 2003). In order to make 
the results country specific for Korea, all variables are considered as deviations with respect 
to Korea’s ones. The set of explanatory variables include: (i) the tax wedges between second 
earners and single individuals (computed as the ratio of the tax on second earners to the 
average tax rate of a single individual with the same gross income); (ii) childcare benefits 
(calculated as the increase in household disposable income from childcare benefits); (iii) tax 
incentives to part-time work; (iv) public spending on pre-primary education; (v) social 
expenditures on families;2 (vi) the female and male unemployment rates; (vii) the wage gaps 
between males and females; (viii) the degrees of employment protection legislation (EPL); 
(vii) the numbers of children per woman (measured by the ratios of children aged 0–14 years 
to women aged 15–64 years); (viii) the female tertiary education rates; and (ix) the logs of 
GDP per capita. Additional variables which have been found to be typically associated with 
female participation rates, such as child subsidies and paid parental leave, have not been 
included due to limited time series availability for Korea.3  
The results from the estimation of equation 1 are reported in Table 1. In the first column of 
the table we present the results for the baseline specification, which includes both time and 
country fixed effects and focuses on the key policy determinants that have typically been 
found in the literature to affect female participation (Jaumotte, 2003). The main results are 
that: (i) the wedge between the tax rates of second earners and single individuals has a 
                                                                 
2 Public expenditure on families is composed of: (i) Child-related cash transfers to families with children: 
including child allowances, with payment levels that in some countries vary with the ages of the children, and 
public income support payments during periods of parental leave; (ii) Public spending on services for families 
with children: direct financing and subsidizing of providers of childcare and early education facilities, public 
childcare support through earmarked payments to parents, public spending on assistance for young people and 
residential facilities, and public spending on family services, including centre-based facilities and home help 
services for families in need; and (iii) Financial support for families provided through the tax system: tax 
expenditures toward families including tax exemptions (e.g. income from childcare benefits that is not included 
in the tax base), child tax allowances (amounts for children that are deducted from gross income and not 
included in taxable income), child tax credits (amounts that are deducted from the tax liabilities). 
3 Jaumotte (2003), based on a sample of 20 OECD countries (excluding Korea), found that childcare subsidies 
and parental leave have positive effects on female participation rates. 
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negative impact on female labor force participation;4 (ii) an increase in childcare benefits has 
a statistically significant and large impact in boosting female participation rates; (iii) tax 
incentives to part-time work tend to increase female participation; and (iv) an increase in the 
probability of being employed (proxied by unemployment outcomes for both males and 
females) tends to improve participation. In contrast, public spending on pre-primary 
education and public expenditure on families do not have significant impacts on female labor 
force participation in Korea compared to other countries. The results, particularly for the tax 
wedge and childcare benefits, are robust to different specifications, different sets of controls, 
and step-wise regression (columns II–VII).5 Finally, while endogeneity may be an issue, 
particularly for the measures of unemployment rates, the results are robust to endogeneity 
checks and Instrumental Variable regression (Table 2). 
The results presented in Table 3 suggest that the effects of these variables vary across the 
different age groups. First, these policies do not seem to significantly affect participation for 
the age group 55–64. Second, while the tax wedge and childcare benefits affect female 
participation in all other age groups, part-time regulations seem to significantly affect 
participation only in women in the 25–39 age group.  
Finally, it is important to stress that, while policy actions can in principle boost female 
participation rates in Korea, much of the cross-country variation in female labor force 
participation is captured by country fixed effects, suggesting that unobserved factors 
including differences in socio-cultural factors and institutional features play the most 
important roles. The compelling question is then what would be the potential impacts of 
reforms aimed at reducing labor market distortions. 
                                                                 
4 The tax wedge is computed as the ratio of Tax second earner to Tax single individual. The tax second earner is 
calculated as: ܶܽݔ	ݏ݁ܿ݋݊݀	݁ܽݎ݊݁ݎ ൌ 1 െ ሺு௢௨௦௘௛௢௟ௗ	ே௘௧	ூ௡௖௢௠௘ሻಳିሺு௢௨௦௘௛௢௟ௗ	ே௘௧	ூ௡௖௢௠௘ሻಲሺு௢௨௦௘௛௢௟ௗ	ீ௥௢௦௦	ூ௡௖௢௠௘ሻಳିሺு௢௨௦௘௛௢௟ௗ	ீ௥௢௦௦	ூ௡௖௢௠௘ሻಲ 
where A represents the case in which the wife does not earn any income and B the case in which the wife’s 
gross earnings are 67 percent that of the Average Production Worker (APW). The tax single individual is 
computed using the same formula, although in this situation the household is only made up of the individual.  
5 Note that the specification with time fixed effects is equivalent to a regression in which all variables are 
demeaned from Korea’s ones. The results presented in Column II, which do not consider time fixed effects, are 
qualitatively similar, even though the effects of the tax wedge, childcare benefits and tax incentives to part-time 
are larger in absolute values. 
  
Table 1. Determinants of Female Labor Force Participation 
 Baseline Robustness checks 
Independent variable (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)a 
        
Tax second earner -0.182** 
(-2.12) 
-0.339*** 
(-3.73) 
-0.230** 
(-2.46) 
-0.189** 
(-2.43) 
-0.264*** 
(-3.19) 
-0.309** 
(-2.25) 
-0.350*** 
(-4.20) 
Childcare benefits 0.389** 
(2.18) 
0.448** 
(2.06) 
0.467** 
(2.30) 
0.263* 
(1.81) 
0.359** 
(2.18) 
0.811*** 
(3.15) 
0.559*** 
(3.45) 
Tax incentive to part time 0.281* 
(1.68) 
0.372* 
(1.80) 
0.179 
(0.98) 
0.216* 
(1.76) 
0.032 
(0.22) 
-0.513 
(-1.06) 
- 
Public spending on pre-primary education 
(log) 
-0.002 
(-0.45) 
-0.005 
(-0.77) 
-0.002 
(-0.58) 
- - -0.005 
(-0.22) 
- 
Public expenditure on family (log) 0.005 
(0.40) 
0.011 
(1.37) 
-0.051 
(-0.84) 
- - 0.015 
(0.57) 
- 
Male unemployment (log) -0.030** 
(-2.34) 
-0.041*** 
(-3.56) 
-0.046*** 
(-4.24) 
-0.046*** 
(-3.88) 
- -0.038* 
(-1.78) 
-0.041** 
(-2.34) 
Female unemployment (log) -0.025** 
(-2.24) 
-0.011 
(-0.91) 
-0.006 
(-0.52) 
-0.015* 
(-1.07) 
- 0.001 
(0.03) 
- 
Number of children (log) 0.068 
(0.57) 
0.041*** 
(3.67) 
0.290*** 
(4.10) 
- - 0.324 
(0.88) 
- 
EPL (log) - - - - - -0.024 
(-0.23) 
- 
Wage gap (log) - - - - - -0.002 
(-0.17) 
- 
Female tertiary education (log) - - - - - -0.085 
(-0.82) 
- 
GDP per capita (log) - - - - - 0.051 
(1.11) 
- 
Country–specific time trends No Yes No No No No No 
Time FE Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 237 237 237 333 333 66 66 
Adjusted R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 
Note: Country fixed effects included but not reported. T-statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses. a results based on stepwise regression. 
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Table 2. Determinants of Female Labor Force Participation, OLS vs. IV 
 OLS IVa 
Independent variable (I) (II) 
   
Tax second earner -0.339*** 
(-3.73) 
-0.196** 
(-1.99) 
Childcare benefits 0.448** 
(2.06) 
0.426** 
(2.49) 
Tax incentive to part time 0.372* 
(1.80) 
0.329* 
(1.94) 
Public spending on pre-primary education (log) -0.005 
(-0.77) 
-0.009 
(-1.00) 
Public expenditure on family (log) 0.011 
(1.37) 
0.001 
(0.06) 
Male unemployment (log) -0.041*** 
(-3.56) 
-0.026 
(-1.06) 
Female unemployment (log) -0.011 
(-0.91) 
-0.029 
(-1.00) 
Number of children (log) 0.041*** 
(3.67) 
0.064 
(0.52) 
Kleibergen-Paap statistic (p-value in parentheses) - 19.864 
(0.02) 
Hansen J statistic (p-value in parentheses) - 5.946 
(0.65) 
Country–specific time trends Yes No 
Time FE No Yes 
N 237 237 
Adjusted R2 0.99 0.99 
Note: Country fixed effects included but not reported. T-statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses. 
a Public expenditures on pre-primary education and family, number of children, and unemployment rates instrumented by their 
lagged values (up to 3 lags), as well as all exogenous variables of the model 
.   
Table 3. Determinants of Female Labor Force Participation, by Age Group  
Dependent variable 15−24 25−39 40-54 55−64 
     
Tax second earner -0.955*** 
(-2.05) 
-0.151* 
(-1.72) 
-0.289** 
(-2.52) 
-0.457 
(-1.61) 
Childcare benefits 2.603** 
(2.15) 
0.474** 
(2.06) 
0.523* 
(1.93) 
-0.472* 
(-1.86) 
Tax incentive to part time 0.300 
(0.41) 
0.462* 
(2.28) 
0.217 
(0.92) 
0.950 
(1.32) 
Male unemployment (log) -0.031 
(-0.53) 
-0.047*** 
(-4.47) 
-0.038** 
(-2.20) 
0.003 
(0.07) 
Female unemployment (log) -0.020 
(-0.20) 
-0.003 
(-0.21) 
-0.009 
(-0.59) 
-0.086* 
(-1.83) 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 212 212 212 212 
Adjusted R2 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Note: Country fixed effects and the controls presented in Table 3 included but not reported. T-statistics based on 
robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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B.   Policy Simulation 
In order to illustrate the potential impacts of policy measures on female participation, a 
number of policy scenarios can be simulated using the results of the estimated equation 
presented in the previous section. Before turning to the analysis, however, it is important to 
highlight the limitations of this approach. First, the results are sensitive to the uncertainties 
associated with the estimates of the effects of structural policies on labor force participation. 
Second, it assumes that it is possible to disentangle the effects of specific reforms, abstracting 
from the complementarity of these reforms and the appropriate sequence of implementation. 
Third, financing requirements associated with the simulated policy changes may imply a 
need for significant increases in (other) tax rates with repercussions on labor force 
participation. These general equilibrium effects have not been taken into account in the 
simulations, which therefore may give a biased picture of the effects of policy reforms 
(Jaumotte, 2003). With these caveats in mind, this analysis can still provide some indication 
of the magnitude of the effects of such reforms in boosting female labor force participation in 
Korea over the medium term. 
The effects of structural reforms on Korea’s female labor force participation are computed by 
simulating a convergence of policy settings toward those prevailing in benchmark countries, 
identified as those with the lowest restrictions. In detail, the potential female participation 
gains (݃௜) from these structural reforms are simulated as: 
݃௜ ൌ ߚ௜	ሺܫ௞ െ ܫ஻ሻ   (2) 
 
where ߚ௜	is, for each indicator I, the estimated 
parameter of the effect of structural reform on 
female labor force participation reported in the 
first column of Table 1, and ܫ௞  and ܫ஻	are the 
values of the indicators in Korea and in the 
benchmark countries, respectively (see chart).  
 
The adjacent chart presents the increases in 
female participation that can be achieved under 
various scenarios. The average participation 
gain from a reform in the tax treatment of 
second earners is about ½ percentage point. 
Policies aimed at reducing unemployment 
would lead to an increase of about 
1.4 percentage points. Reform of the tax 
incentives to part-time work would result in an 
increase of about 2 percentage points. Finally, 
reforms aimed at closing the gap between Korea 
and the benchmark countries in terms of 
childcare benefits would result in a significant 
increase in participation of about 4 percentage points. Combining these scenarios, the results 
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suggest that a comprehensive set of reforms aimed at reducing the distortions captured by 
these indicators would lead to an increase in female participation rates of about 8 percentage 
points over the medium term, which would imply a reduction of the gap between male and 
female participation of about 33 percent.6 
III.   RAISING YOUTH EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR FORCE 
Despite the decrease in youth unemployment observed over the last two decades, the youth 
employment rate in Korea remains relatively low compared to those in other OECD 
countries. Indeed, the data on youth participation suggest that the main factor driving the 
lower unemployment rate for youth has been the decline in labor force participation. In 
particular, the youth participation rate has decreased steadily over the last two decades, from 
about 37 percent in 1994 to around 26½ percent in 2012, one of the lowest in OECD 
countries (the average youth participation rate in the OECD is about 47½ percent). 
Although the low youth participation rate may reflect the increasing rates of enrollment in 
tertiary education and military conscription7, it also reflects the degree of labor market 
mismatch, which pushes young graduates to withdraw from the labor force as they fail to find 
opportunities matching their qualifications. The next section will analyze this issue, by 
constructing a measure of labor market mismatch and assessing its impact on youth 
employment. 
A.   Labor Market Mismatch and Youth Employment 
To construct a measure of the degree of mismatch, we follow the methodology in Estevao 
and Tsounta (2011) and Peters (2000). The metric to proxy skill mismatches is the difference 
between the skill demand and skill supply in the economy. The skill mismatch index (SMI) is 
defined as: 
SMI୲ ൌ ∑ ሺS୨୲	ିM୨୲ሻଶଷ୨ୀଵ ,         (3) 
where workers’ skills are divided into three levels, proxied by educational attainment: 1=low 
(less than high school), 2=semi (high school graduates), and 3=high skill (bachelor’s degrees 
or higher). ௝ܵ௧	stands for the supply of the skill level of j, measured by the share of the 
population with the corresponding educational attainment. Korea’s population census is 
compiled every five years, and so to compute the annual skill level supplies, the data for the 
in-between years are interpolated. The skill demand ܯ௝௧	is computed as the share of 
employees in industries that have skill intensity j, where the employee data by industry is 
taken from the Korean Ministry of Employment and Labor (MOEL)’s survey at 
                                                                 
6 As discussed earlier, the effect of a comprehensive set of reforms abstracts from reforms complementarity, and 
it implicitly assumes that the effect of reforms in single policy areas is addictive. 
7 Bernal-Verdugo et al. (2012) show that military conscription is on the main factor affecting youth employment 
rates. 
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establishment. The skill intensity of each industry with a two-digit industrial code (KSIC8) is 
based on that industry’s skill intensity score in the base year (2006), which is the weighted 
average educational attainment of the employees in that industry.9 The skill intensity of 
industries calculated for Korea is provided in the appendix. 
For a robustness check, another measure of skill-demand from industry is calculated based on 
occupation data. Autor et al. (2003) grouped occupations into three categories—routine 
manual, routine cognitive, and non-routine cognitive. We use the employment statistics by 
occupation based on the MOEL’s survey at establishment. The nine occupations (one-digit 
KSCO10 specifications) are divided into three categories (Table 4), exactly the same as in 
Autor et al. (2003). We apply this categorization and compute the ratio of the workers 
employed in each category to the total number of workers. 
Table 4.Skill Levels, by Occupation 
 
 
 
 
 
     
The chart presents the evolution of the indicator 
of skill mismatches constructed using both 60 
2-digit industries and nine occupations. The 
chart shows that mismatches decreased 
considerably immediately after the Asian crisis, 
but have leveled off since 2005. While the 
indicator of mismatches does not seem to be 
related with the evolution of unemployment 
(either overall or youth, see chart), it is strongly 
                                                                 
8 KSIC stands for Korean Standard Industrial Classification. The following three industries are excluded from 
the analysis: Public Administration and Defense; Compulsory Social Security (KSIC code: 76); Private 
Households with Employed Persons (KSIC code: 95), and Extra-Territorial Organizations and Bodies (KSIC 
code: 99). 
9 Employees younger than 18 years of age or older than 64 are excluded from skill intensity computation, and 
the weights of 1, 2 and 3 are given to low-, middle- and high-skilled employees, respectively. We compute the 
average and standard deviations of the skill intensity scores; industries with scores higher than the total average 
plus 0.67*standard deviations are classified as high-skilled. If the skill intensity score is lower than the total 
average minus 0.67*standard deviation, the corresponding industry is grouped as low-skilled. All other 
industries are classified as middle-skilled. 
10 KSCO stands for Korean Standard Classification of Occupations. This analysis adopts the KSCO data revised 
in 2007 (7th revision). 
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associated with the youth employment rate (see chart). This is particularly the case for the 
indicator of mismatches for youth (YSMI2). 
The weak (strong) association with youth 
unemployment (employment) is confirmed 
when we regress unemployment 
(employment) against our measure of labor 
market mismatches and several control 
variables (Tables 5–6) —including current and 
lagged GDP growth, a time trend, and a 
dummy variable that takes a value equal to 
one during the Asian crisis. In particular, the 
results suggest that a 10 percent decrease in 
labor market mismatches could increase the 
employment rates by about 6 to 14 percentage 
points over the medium term. In other words, 
policy actions bringing skill mismatches back 
onto a downward path before 2005 can 
increase the employment rates substantially.  
Key areas of intervention to reduce labor 
market mismatches include: (i) improving 
social dialogue to identify the gaps between 
school curricula and business needs; (ii) 
enhancing technical vocational education and 
training, including apprenticeships; (iii) introducing mechanisms for early identification of 
potential labor force leavers to encourage them to access other employment, education or 
training opportunities; (iv) including job-search techniques in school curricula; and (v) 
improving young people’s access to information on career opportunities.  
Table 5. Mismatches and Labor Market Outcomes  
 UR YUR ER ER 
ln(SMI)t 10.15 
(0.593) 
0.687 
(0.558) 
-1.348** 
(0.485) 
-0.560* 
(0.282) 
∆ln(GDP)t -0.478* 
(0.241) 
-0.550** 
(0.230) 
0.362* 
(0.196) 
-0.122 
(0.204) 
∆ln(GDP)t-1 -0.577** 
(0.267) 
-0.592** 
(0.258) 
0.495* 
(0.232) 
-0.269 
(0.294) 
 
Time trend 0.120 
(0.125) 
0.094 
(0.119) 
-0.115 
(0.101) 
-0.116* 
(0.065) 
Dummy (98,99) no no no yes 
     
R2 0.62 0.64 0.63 0.87 
Note: UR=overall (15-64 years old) unemployment rate; YUR= youth (15-29 years old) unemployment rate; ER= overall 
employment/population ratio. Dummy (98,99) equals 1 for years 1998 and 1999. A constant is included in all regressions. 
The standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity, no autocorrelation in residuals is detected with the 
Lagrange test, and *,** and *** denote significances of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 6. Mismatches and Youth Employment Rates  
 YER YER YER 
ln(SMI)t -1.455*** 
(0.284) 
-2.122*** 
(0.393) 
-1.086*** 
(0.276) 
ln(SMI)t-1  0.828* 
(0.461) 
 
∆ln(GDP)t 0.272** 
(0.105) 
0.238** 
(0.095) 
0.046 
(0.129) 
(0.204) 
∆ln(GDP)t-1 0.408*** 
(0.100) 
0.448*** 
(0.119) 
0.052 
(0.220) 
 
Time trend -0.330*** 
(0.119) 
-0.298*** 
(0.069) 
-0.330*** 
(0.062) 
Dummy (98,99) No No Yes 
    
R2 0.87 0.90 0.91 
Note: YER= youth (15-29 years old) employment/population ratio. Dummy (98,99) equals 1 for years 1998 and 1999. A 
constant is included in all regressions. The standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity, no 
autocorrelation in the residuals is detected with the Lagrange test, and *,** and *** denote significances of 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
IV.   REDUCING LABOR MARKET DUALISM 
Regular workers account for less than 
50 percent of total employees in Korea (see 
chart). Among non-regular workers—which 
include (i) temporary workers, (ii) daily workers, 
(iii) the self-employed, and (iv) unpaid family 
workers—the largest proportions are those of 
temporary workers and the self-employed.  
Non-regular workers are typically less educated 
(the share of non-regular workers with tertiary 
education is about 30 percent, compared to that 
of more than 50 percent for regular workers), tend to receive less social insurance coverage 
(about 40 percent of non-regular workers are covered by employees’ pension schemes and 
health insurance, compared to about 80 percent for regular workers) and are characterized by 
having more flexible contracts. Overall, non-regular workers are mostly concentrated in the 
service sector, and temporary workers are typically employed in firms with less than 
three thousand dependents (Jones and Urasawa, 2013). 
This dualism stems from the high protection afforded regular workers, which leads firms to 
hire less costly non-regular workers. The latter are not provided with adequate training, 
which negatively impacts productivity. Moreover, because of high wage costs due to the 
seniority–based wage system (with the length of tenure in firms peaking at about age 50), 
many firms tend to push workers to retire before their mandatory retirement ages (which 
averaged 57 years in 2010), either through providing them less favorable working conditions 
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(such as undesirable jobs) or through pecuniary incentives. Given the low pension 
replacement rate, such workers tend to become non-regular workers or self-employed in low 
productivity service industries. 
While Korea’s labor market duality has some positive aspects (first, it has contributed to 
keeping unemployment low; second, almost 50 percent of non-regular workers are 
voluntarily so, with a significant part of them accepting part-time contracts to balance work 
with other activities and to benefit from more flexible working hours), there are significant 
economic costs associated with labor market dualism. First, a lower share of non-regular 
workers (who are typically more sensitive to business cycle fluctuations) makes the labor 
market more resilient to demand shocks. Second, high dualism (in the form of a high share of 
non-regular workers) reduces the incentives of firms for investing in on-the-job training and 
other human capital accumulation practices for a large share of their employees, thereby 
reducing productivity.11 Third, labor market dualism, by increasing inequality12, may also 
reduce macro-stability and limit the prospects for sustained high potential growth (IMF, 
2013). Therefore, reducing the labor market dualism in Korea is important not only for 
addressing income inequality but also for promoting job stability and fostering productivity. 
Which policies can help to reduce labor market dualism? A first priority is to reduce the 
relatively high degree of employment protection for regular workers, which provides an 
incentive for firms to hire workers on non-regular bases in order to reduce their labor costs. 13 
In this context, policies aimed at reducing working hours (currently among the highest in 
OECD countries) could facilitate the acceptance of a reduction in employment protection. 
Second, raising the age set by firms for mandatory retirement and re-modulating the 
seniority-based wage system will be keys to reducing the incentives for firms to push workers 
to early retirement and to non-regular contracts. Third, improving social coverage for non-
regular workers would reduce the labor cost gap between regular and non-regular workers, 
and thereby the incentive for firms to hire workers on non-regular bases, while increasing 
productivity by the enhancement of job security. Fourth, broadening the access to training 
opportunities for non-regular workers, which are typically not provided by firms, is important 
for fostering productivity at the aggregate level.  
V.   CONCLUSIONS 
After a period of exceptional growth, Korean economic growth has gradually slowed since 
the mid-1990s. Although this slowdown in growth has not translated into rising 
unemployment rates (which have continued to decline and are among the lowest among 
OECD countries), labor market segmentation and the underemployment of some segments of 
                                                                 
11 Empirical evidence suggests that labor market duality typically reduces productivity growth (Dolado et al. 
2011; Damiani et al. 2011). 
12 Koske et al. (2011) find that Korea is one the few OECD countries where income inequality originates mostly 
due to duality in the labor market. 
13 Empirical evidence based on international experience suggests that reducing employment rigidities for regular 
workers, while improving job protection for non-regular workers, can significantly reduce labor market dualism 
(Nunziata and Staffolani, 2007; Jaumotte, 2011; Aoyagi and Ganelli, 2013).  
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the population (notably, youth and women) are important labor market challenges and factors 
contributing to lower potential growth. Addressing these problems requires a comprehensive 
and well-sequenced set of structural reforms, which are summarized as follow: 
Boosting female labor force participation 
 increase investment in public childcare and childcare benefits;  
 improve the work-life balance by facilitating more part-time work opportunities;  
 make the tax treatment of second earners in households more neutral compared with 
that of single earners;  
 address labor market dualism to improve job opportunities for women. 
Increasing youth employment  
 reduce skill mismatches by enhancing technical vocational education and training, 
including job-search techniques in school curricula by improving young people’s 
access to information on career opportunities and reducing the lack of information 
available to youth as well as to SMEs; 
 address labor market dualism to improve job opportunities for youth.  
Reducing labor market dualism  
 increase the age set by firms for mandatory retirement and re-modulate the seniority-
based wage systems to reduce the incentives for firms to push workers into early 
retirement and non-regular contracts;  
 reduce the relatively high degree of employment protection given for regular workers, 
to reduce the incentives for firms to hire workers on non-regular bases; 
 broaden the access to training opportunities for non-regular workers, including via 
strengthening of targeted educational policies, and promote their transitions to regular 
employment; 
 improve social coverage for non-regular workers, to reduce the incentives for firms to 
hire non-regular workers and improve job security. 
Our results suggest that the benefits of comprehensive structural reforms are likely to be 
considerable over the medium term. In particular, comprehensive policy reforms (such as: 
making the tax treatment of second earners in households compared with that of single 
earners more neutral; increasing childcare benefits; and facilitating more part-time work 
opportunities) aimed at reducing labor market distortions that inhibit labor force participation 
could lead to an increase in female participation rates of about 8 percentage points over the 
medium term, which would reduce by one-third the gap between the rates of male and female 
participation. Similarly, policy actions—including targeted educational policies and 
retraining programs—bringing skill mismatches back onto a downward path before 2005 can 
increase youth employment rates by 0.6 percentage points per year, which would boost the 
youth employment rate back to its pre-Asian crisis level within 10 years. Finally, reforms 
aimed at reducing labor market duality are likely to further enhance economic growth by 
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boosting employment rates for youth and women and by increasing productivity at the 
sectoral (mostly services) and aggregate levels. 
Addressing labor market duality and low participation is therefore a key priority for 
achieving sustained and inclusive growth, and the recent and ongoing policy actions launched 
by the authorities are important steps in this direction. Indeed, the government has a broad 
reform agenda for tackling labor market duality and boosting the employment rate to 
70 percent by 2017. Its “70 Percent Roadmap” shifts the focus of job creation from the 
current male, manufacturing and conglomerate orientations toward females, services and 
SMEs. It also focuses on increasing youth and aged employment, improving the work-life 
balance by cutting the long working hours and expanding social insurance, including through 
subsidizing low-income employees of SMEs, eliminating discrimination for non-regular 
workers, and increasing the mobility between regular and non-regular workers.  
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KSIC
Industry Code
Industry Skill intensity 
Skill Demand
Category
1 Agriculture 2.184 M
2 Forestry 2.393 M
5 Fishing 1.921 L
10 Mining of Coal, Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas, 
Uranium and Thorium Ores
1.503 L
11 Mining of Metal Ores 1.677 L
12 Mining of Non-metallic Minerals, Except Fuel 2.016 L
15 Manufacture of Food Products and Beverages 1.999 L
16 Manufacture of Tobacco Products 2.231 M
17 Manufacture of Textiles, Except Sewn Wearing 
apparel
1.979 L
18 Manufacture of Sewn Wearing Apparel and 
Fur Articles
2.082 M
19 Tanning and Dressing of Leather , Manufacture of 
Luggage and Footwear
2.004 L
20
Manufacture of Wood and of Products of Wood and 
Cork, Except Furniture; Manufacture of Articles of 
Straw and Plaiting Materials
1.984 L
21 Manufacture of Pulp, Paper and Paper Products 2.061 M
22 Publishing, Printing and Reproduction of Recorded 
Media
2.489 H
23 Manufacture of Coke, Refined Petroleum Products 
and Nuclear Fuel
2.391 M
24 Manufacture of Chemicals and Chemical Products 2.321 M
25 Manufacture of Rubber and Plastic Products 2.066 M
26 Manufacture of Other Non-metallic Mineral Products 2.056 M
27 Manufacture of Basic Metals 1.999 L
28 Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products, 
Except Machinery and Furniture
2.062 M
29 Manufacture of Other Machinery and Equipment 2.166 M
30 Manufacture of Computers and Office Machinery 2.360 M
31 Manufacture of Electrical Machinery and 
Apparatuseses n.e.c.
2.151 M
32 Manufacture of Electronic Components, Radio, 
Television and 
2.261 M
33 Manufacture of Medical, Precision and Optical 
Instruments, Watches and Clocks
2.253 M
34 Manufacture of Motor Vehicles, Trailers and 
Semitrailers
2.043 L
35 Manufacture of Other Transport Equipment 2.087 M
36 Manufacture of Furniture; Manufacturing of 
Articles n.e.c.
2.017 L
37 Recycling 1.897 L
40 Electricity, Gas, Steam and Hot Water Supply 2.454 H
41 Collection, Purification and Distribution of Water 2.777 H
45 General Construction 2.559 H
46 Special Trade Construction 2.249 M
Appendix I. Skill Intensities of Industries in Korea 
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 KSIC
Industry Code Industry Skill intensity
Skill Demand
Category
50 Sale of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles ;Retail Sale of Automotive Fuel 2.255 M
51 Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except ofMotor Vehicles and Motorcycles 2.424 H
52 Retail Trade, Except Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 2.243 M
55 Hotels and Restaurants 2.024 L
60 Land Transport ; Transport Via Pipelines 1.899 L
61 Water Transport 2.362 M
62 Air Transport 2.677 H
63 Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities ;Activities of Travel Agencies 2.265 M
64 Post and Telecommunications 2.426 H
65 Financial Institutions, Except Insurance andPension Funding 2.421 H
66 Insurance and Pension Funding, Except CompulsorySocial Security 2.669 H
67 Activities Auxiliary to Financial Intermediation 2.681 H
70 Real Estate Activities 2.036 L
71 Renting of Machinery and Equipment withoutOperator and of 2.312 M
72 Computer and Related Activities 2.778 H
73 Research and Development 2.780 H
74 Professional, Scientific and Technical Services 2.591 H
75 Business Support Services 2.120 M
80 Education 2.690 H
85 Human Health and Veterinary Activities 2.243 M
86 Social Work Activities 2.276 M
87 Motion Picture, Broadcasting and PerformingArts Industries 2.583 H
88 Other Recreational, Cultural and Sporting Activities 2.253 M
90 Sewage and Refuse Disposal, Sanitation andSimilar Activities 1.895 L
91 Membership Organizations n.e.c. 2.534 H
92 Maintenance and Repair Services 2.067 M
93 Other Services Activities 2.048 L
Mean 2.237
Std Dev 0.276
Mean+0.67*Std Dev 2.422
Mean-0.67*Std Dev 2.053
 
